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Challenges and Opportunities Facing Religious 
Freedom in the Public Square 
Judge J. Clifford Wallace ∗
In this opening address, I highlight several reasons why I feel our 
conference topic—the challenges and opportunities facing the free 
exercise of religion in the public sphere—merits our enthusiasm and 
careful consideration. I begin by pointing out some of the many 
ways in which religious freedom can invigorate and reinforce 
democratic government. I then propose a simple metaphor—the 
public square—that may be useful in evaluating how well various 
nations have nurtured the freedom of religion. By framing the 
inquiry in terms of the public square, we can also identify some of 
the challenges to free exercise both in this nation and abroad. I 
briefly examine the views of the Founders of the United States 
Constitution and then consider two of the obstacles faced in other 
countries in ensuring that diverse individuals can choose, embrace, 
or altogether reject different religions in the public square. 
I. THE SECULAR VALUE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
As I see it, religious freedom and democracy go hand in hand; 
each strengthens and reinforces the other in several ways. First, many 
believe the free exercise of religion can promote a more humanitarian 
and tolerant society. For example, most religions teach the 
importance of a power greater than one’s self. The very nature of this 
belief puts an adherent in a position where he or she believes that the 
beginning and end of all creation, and the importance of life, 
transcend individual needs and wants.1 As one comes to understand 
∗ Senior Judge and former Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. The views expressed in this article are entirely the author’s. He does not attempt to 
reflect the views of the other members of his court. He is indebted to K. Cain for her valuable 
assistance with this article. 
 1. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: 
Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1588 
(1987) (“The religious link between the mundane here and now of physical existence and the 
possibility of a transcendent, enduring reality beyond, instills in many religious people the 
desire and duty to improve their own lot and that of their fellows by suggesting the moral 
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that others are equally subordinated, there exists a greater likelihood 
of involvement with other members of society. One becomes more 
attuned to the horizontal equality that knits a community together, 
as well as the vertical belief in a higher power, which instills a sense 
of humility. A greater horizontal and vertical sense of society creates 
a “turning out,” or a turning away from self toward society. This 
“turning out” phenomenon increases the possibility of genuine 
concern for others and is important to a society that cares for those 
in need.2
Second, most religions promote civic virtue and influence 
believers to be law abiding.3 Democratic societies generally function 
because the vast majority of people are willing to obey the law 
without enforcement action by the state.4 Even if possible, it does 
not make sense to allocate limited government resources to a police 
force capable of enforcing all laws in a non-law abiding society. 
Allowing people to exercise religious beliefs that tend to encourage 
acceptance of legal norms can therefore further a law-abiding 
culture, which is essential to democracy.5
Third, religious freedom preserves an important opportunity for 
choice, which is a key component of liberty. When each religious 
community is free to proclaim its tenets and teach others, there will 
possibilities of a better way of living, and by cultivating respect for law, including a greater 
willingness to restrict one’s own choices and actions to benefit others. Thus, religious 
consciousness is an important positive influence on the substance of societal values.”).
 2. In addition to the individual “turning out” effect, religious institutions also display 
a “turning out” by providing various humanitarian services. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 
397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that religious organizations 
“contribute to the well-being of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby 
bear burdens that would otherwise either have to be met by general taxation, or be left 
undone, to the detriment of the community”).
 3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972) (“[T]his record strongly 
shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within our society, 
even if apart from the conventional ‘mainstream.’ Its members are productive and very 
law-abiding members of society . . . .”).
 4. President John Adams remarked, “[W]e have no government armed with power 
capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion . . . .” DAVID 
BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT 319 & n.2 (3d ed. 2000). See also Gedicks & Hendrix, supra 
note 1, at 1595 (“Because even a relatively small number of dissenters can render law 
enforcement ineffective, an overwhelming majority of persons must be willing voluntarily to 
restrict their personal choices and actions to those not prohibited by law if law is to have 
significant force and effect.”).
 5. In the words of Benjamin Franklin, “[O]nly a virtuous people are capable of 
freedom. As nations become corrupt and vicious, they have more need of masters.” BARTON, 
supra note 4, at 321 & n.13. 
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be a wider landscape of varying religious views and a broader 
spectrum of choices. As a result, each individual has a greater 
opportunity to make a choice that best fits his or her personal needs. 
Religious freedom is therefore both an important end in itself as well 
as one of the cornerstones of self-determination, individual choice 
and pluralism.6 There is a profound liberty interest in being able to 
choose something as fundamental and personal as religion.7 Thus, 
with freedom to thrive, religions can help elevate the political process 
in society to a higher plane of democracy and individual freedom.8 
Freedom to choose a religion that best fits individual needs will also 
result in a more stable, satisfied society.9
Finally, just as our collective viewpoint is enriched by ethnic and 
racial diversity, so too can diversity in religious cultures contribute to 
 6. See Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SUP. 
CT. REV. 83, 107–13 (1983), for a discussion of personal freedom as a justification for the 
special constitutional treatment of religion. See also Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) at 1 (1993), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm. The 
Kokkinakis court explained the relationship between freedom of religion and democracy as 
follows: 
[F]reedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations 
of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention [for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms]. It is, in its 
religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up 
the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a 
precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The 
pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly 
won over the centuries, depends on it. 
Id. at 17.
 7. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“By its nature, religion—in the comprehensive sense in which the Constitution 
uses that word—is an aspect of human thought and action which profoundly relates the life of 
man to the world in which he lives.”); Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 1, at 1602.
 8. “Respect for the exercise of conscience and religion is a fundamental aspect of a 
universal understanding of human rights.” Orrin G. Hatch, Religious Liberty at Home and 
Abroad: Reflections on Protecting this Fundamental Freedom, 2001 BYU L. REV. 413, 413–14.
 9. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 19–21 (Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc. 2d ed. 1990) (1689) (recognizing that the legitimacy and stability of a political 
regime can be enhanced by tolerating a range of religious outlooks); cf. THOMAS I. EMERSON, 
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–9 (1970) (positing that in a democratic society, 
the system of freedom of expression is based on, inter alia, the principle that freedom of 
expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment and is a method of 
achieving a more adaptable, stable community). 
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our political and social discourse.10 It is important to consider diverse 
perspectives in dealing with new challenges facing our society. 
II. FREEDOM IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE—A METAPHOR FOR 
EVALUATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
With this background, we can turn to assessing how well various 
nations have been strengthening and protecting diverse religious 
cultures. One measure of a country’s success is how well it treats all 
religions and how freely its people are able to openly practice their 
beliefs. In this regard, our focus can be more precise: while the topic 
of our conference is religion in the public sphere, I propose we 
examine the extent to which a country has nurtured the free exercise 
of religion by focusing on whether it has promoted religious freedom 
in the public square. 
In earlier days, and to some extent still, communities had a block 
of land in the center of the city where open communication and 
debate would occur. Hyde Park Corner in London, England, is a 
good example of such a public square.11 The communication and 
debate that took place in these forums is vital to the free exercise of 
 10. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“[R]eligious organizations . . . uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society by 
their religious activities. . . . [E]ach group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, 
and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.”); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 
U.S. 141, 150 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“[U]nity and strength are best accomplished, 
not by enforced orthodoxy of views, but by diversity of opinion through the fullest possible 
measure of freedom of conscience and thought.”); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The 
Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986). Karst explained: 
Today’s constitutional doctrines of equal citizenship, freedom of religion, 
and freedom of expression mediate cultural conflict by opening our public 
life to the participation of cultural minorities. By defending against 
cultural subordination and the coercion of cultural conformity, the same 
doctrines also promote tolerance for cultural difference. Together, these 
guarantees promise individuals broad freedom to choose for themselves 
among “the varieties of ethnic experience.” 
Id. at 336.
 11. See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 439, 488 (2003). Hunter noted the following about public squares: 
The ideal of the public forum suggests a place where citizens can 
congregate, air their grievances, debate public policy, and be confronted 
with new thoughts and arguments. Archetypal public forums include the 
Athenian Senate and Hyde Park’s Speaker’s Corner, and the myth of their 
influence and importance is hard to dispel. 
Id.
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religion. If we visited the town squares of various communities, 
would we find religions free to advance their causes openly without 
fear of government interference? Does freedom of religion grow and 
develop in the town square unmolested by dominant religions? 
These broad “public square” questions may help us focus on 
particular restrictions on religion and then critically evaluate these 
restrictions in order to determine whether they are justifiable.12 
Clearly, a sensible approach to promoting religious freedom must be 
principled, pragmatic, and flexible, while maintaining a keen eye 
toward ferreting out pretextual restrictions that are designed to 
suppress unpopular religious beliefs. 
Perhaps some specific questions will further refine the public 
square examination: 
1. Can all churches proffer their religious beliefs? 
2. Are all religions treated equally by the state? 
3. Can religious groups teach others their beliefs openly and 
encourage acceptance? 
4. Are there government restrictions on open and free 
religious dialogue? 
5. Are there restrictions on the distribution of written 
materials used to explain one’s religious views, or can 
 12. Consider, for example, the analysis of the European Court of Human Rights in Serif 
v. Greece, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (1999), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/ 
Judgments.htm. In that case, Serif claimed his conviction for “usurping the functions of a 
minister of a ‘known religion’ and publicly wearing the uniform of such a minister amounted 
to a violation of his rights” under Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Id. at 77. Article 9 provides:  
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. 
Id. at 84. The court reasoned that while  
[i]t is true that in a democratic society it may be necessary to place 
restrictions on freedom of religion to reconcile the interests of the various 
religious groups . . . any such restriction must correspond to a “pressing 
social need” and must be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.” 
Id. at 87 (internal citations omitted). After weighing the competing interests at stake in the 
case, the court concluded that Serif’s Article 9 rights had been violated. Id. at 89.
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religious institutions and their adherents freely distribute 
such materials? 
6. Are there visa restrictions placed on visitors entering the 
country who wish to teach religion? 
After identifying restrictions on religion, we should ask whether 
those restrictions are arguably justified by balancing the importance 
of free exercise against other societal goals. For example: 
1. Does a religion adopt terrorism as a tenet or practice of 
its sect, or does it advocate violation of generally 
accepted criminal laws? 
2. Does a religion teach concepts that are in violation of 
basic human rights? 
3. Is a restriction on religion necessary to ensure that others 
can freely exercise their religious beliefs? 
4. Are the religious restrictions aimed at silencing unwanted 
religious views? 
By focusing on specific facets of free exercise in the public 
square, we can develop a general sense of where various nations have 
drawn the line between establishing a national religion, tolerating all 
religions equally, and, at the other end of the spectrum, wiping 
religion out of the public square. Let us consider some examples. 
III. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF ILLUSTRATIVE PUBLIC SQUARES 
The challenges to religious freedom will vary among countries 
and regions based on differences in culture, history, structure of 
government, and myriad other factors. Applying the public square 
metaphor to varying nations, we can evaluate how well they have 
encouraged and established freedom of religion. The experience of 
the United States provides one of many possible starting points, 
which I briefly discuss here only for comparative purposes. 
A. United States: Non-Discriminatory Encouragement of Religion 
The success of the United States Constitution as an authoritative 
document of governance can be observed by the fact that it has now 
existed for more than two hundred years—the longest life of any 
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written constitution in the history of the world.13 Examining the 
views of the Founders of the Constitution can shed light on why 
even today we feel religious freedom is so integral to the social and 
political fabric of our nation as well as inform us about the challenges 
to religious freedom that have nonetheless been a part of this 
nation’s history. 
The Founders sought to protect the important societal and 
individual values of free religion in part by means of the 
Establishment Clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”14 As I have explained elsewhere, the 
Founders’ primary concern was to prevent the establishment of a 
dominant religion—the power of which would squelch the voice of 
smaller religions.15 They did not create an impenetrable wall to 
prevent any relations between government and religion. Nowhere in 
the Constitution are the words “wall of separation”16 to be found.17 
However, subsequent misinterpreters of the Constitution and its 
Founders have embraced the now-proverbial “separation of church 
and state,”18 with some advocating a government that is indifferent 
to the role of religion in our society. 
History seems to support the argument that the Establishment 
Clause was not meant to be interpreted as anti-religious, but only as 
 13. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 811 (1986). 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This prohibition has been enforced against the states by 
incorporation of the First Amendment into the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First Amendment 
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the 
states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”). 
 15. J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’ Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001 
BYU L. REV. 755, 769.
 16. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 161 (2002). See infra 
note 21 and accompanying text for the historical context of the phrase. 
 17. HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 756 & n.16 (“[N]one of the twenty drafts of the 
religion clauses generated by the state ratification process and the First Congress contained this 
or similar phrases.”).
 18. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“The First Amendment 
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We 
could not approve the slightest breach.”); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed 
to separate religion and government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the 
foundation of our democracy.”).
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a prohibition on preferential treatment for a particular church.19 I 
believe the Chief Justice of the United States had the better of the 
argument on this issue when he wrote the following in his dissent in 
an Establishment Clause case: 
The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke [during the First 
Congress’ debates on the First Amendment] were concerned, 
appears to have been the establishment of a national church, and 
perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another; but it was 
definitely not concerned about whether the Government might aid 
all religions evenhandedly.20
It is true that in a letter to a small religious group, Thomas 
Jefferson, in the later years of his life, did state that the 
Establishment Clause erected “a wall of separation between church 
and state.”21 But as I have argued elsewhere, there can be no 
“legislative history” from this statement as Mr. Jefferson was out of 
the country at the time the amendments were debated and 
adopted.22 Indeed, his earlier history demonstrates, and his actions 
verify, that he did not embrace a governmental position of anti-
religion; rather, he merely conditioned government assistance on 
equal access by all sects.23
Thus, the Establishment Clause was not meant to be anti-
religious. It was adopted only to be sure that no national religion 
 19. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 13–14. Hamburger states that 
the First Amendment has often been understood to limit religious 
freedom in ways never imagined by the late eighteenth-century dissenters 
who demanded constitutional guarantees of religious liberty. . . . Not 
least, the dissenters sought the First Amendment and other constitutional 
provisions to prevent government from discriminating on account of 
religious differences. 
Id.; see also Wallace, supra note 15, at 756. 
 20. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
 21. HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 161; see also id. at 155–62 for a discussion of the 
historical context of Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Association.
 22. Wallace, supra note 15, at 767–68.
 23. See id. at 768; see also HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 181: 
After writing to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802, Jefferson 
himself apparently did not again directly advocate separation. He 
continued to denounce the union of church and state, but he seems not 
to have expressly urged separation. For example, when . . . he denounced 
political preaching in 1815, he did not do so in terms of the separation of 
church and state. 
Id.
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was established and that no preferential treatment would be given to 
a particular church, thereby assuring all religions a voice in the public 
square. At its inception, there was no “wall of separation” but rather 
a principle of encouragement of religions without discrimination—
under the First Amendment, Congress was enjoined from 
“prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. With no nationally 
recognized religion and a prohibition on governmental interference 
with and discrimination against different religious practices, freedom 
of religion in the public square would have the fertile ground it 
needs to thrive. 
My point today is not to reassess the debate between proponents 
of these differing constitutional interpretations. Rather, I highlight 
this dilemma because it illustrates one of the challenges faced by all 
societies—namely, the difficulty of drawing a sensible line between 
establishing religion and wiping it out of the public square 
altogether. I suggest the Framers embraced a position between these 
two points: non-discriminatory encouragement of all religions. 
Reasonable minds can certainly differ on precisely where the line 
should be drawn in particular cases, and much of the debate about 
the role of religion vis-à-vis government boils down to this 
fundamental question. 
B. Challenges Abroad 
Further applying this public square inquiry, we can now turn to 
identifying and evaluating some of the challenges to free exercise 
abroad. By way of example, I call to your attention two specific 
obstacles: the view that religious pluralism must be suppressed in 
order to promote a more stable society, and the stifling influence of a 
dominant religion. Two cases decided by the European Court of 
Human Rights are illustrative, and I discuss each in turn. 
First, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova illustrates the 
view held by some that religious pluralism disrupts stable societies. 
In this case, the European Court of Human Rights considered 
whether the Moldovan authorities’ refusal to recognize the 
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia unlawfully infringed on freedom 
of religion and association in violation of Article 9 of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
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(“Convention”).24 Pursuant to the Religious Denominations Act, 
only religions recognized by the government could be practiced.25
The government contended, among other things, that because 
the Republic of Moldova had been recognized as an independent 
state only since 1991, it “had few strengths it could depend on to 
ensure its continued existence, but one factor conducive to stability 
was religion, the majority of the population being Orthodox 
Christians.”26 Therefore, the government argued, if the Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia was officially recognized, the “tie was likely to 
be lost and the Orthodox Christian population dispersed among a 
number of Churches.”27
The court recognized that protection of public order was a 
legitimate aim, but it nonetheless held that 
the refusal to recognise the applicant Church has such 
consequences for the applicants’ freedom of religion that it cannot 
be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued or, 
accordingly, as necessary in a democratic society, and that there has 
been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.28
The court also stated that “the role of the authorities . . . is not to 
remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure 
that the competing groups tolerate each other.”29
Thus, as this case demonstrates, one challenge facing religious 
freedom in the public square is the belief that religious pluralism will 
lead to societal instability. Proponents of this view contend that if 
there are fewer choices—or perhaps only one choice—there will be 
fewer or no differences in religious views, thus resulting in a more 
stable society.30 But put in context, such instability is an unavoidable 
 24. Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39, 107 (2002), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm.
 25. Id. at 110. In addition to being unable to practice their religion, unrecognized 
churches could not defend their rights in the courts. As a result, members of the Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia were unable to defend themselves against physical attacks and 
persecution, and the Church could not protect its assets. Id. at 116.
 26. Id. at 111.
 27. Id. at 112.
 28. Id. at 119.
 29. Id. at 113.
 30. See also Serif v. Greece, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (1999), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm. In Serif, the Greek government contended 
that “the authorities had to intervene in order to avoid the creation of tension among the 
Muslims in Rodopi and between the Muslims and the Christians of the area as well as Greece 
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aspect of democracy. Democratic elections cause instability. Even 
when a political leader is democratically elected, various voices 
strongly advocate their positions, and there are ordinarily adherents 
in more than one political camp. This instability and pluralism is a 
basic value within a democratic society;31 it is the liberty interest of 
choice that is the basis of democracy.32 Accordingly, it is important 
to ask why religious differences should be singled out for 
discrimination.33 With so much natural and expected instability in a 
democratic society, how can special restrictions on religion be 
justified? 
Yet another obstacle to religious freedom—the stifling influence 
of a dominant religion—was at issue in Kokkinakis v. Greece.34 Article 
13 of the Constitution of Greece provides: “There shall be freedom 
to practise any known religion; individuals shall be free to perform 
their rites of worship without hindrance and under the protection of 
the law. The performance of rites of worship must not prejudice 
and Turkey.” Id. at 88. See also Buscarini v. San Marino, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 605, (1999). In 
Buscarini, members of Parliament were required to take an oath on the Holy Gospels, and the 
government attempted to justify this requirement by arguing the oath was needed to “preserve 
public order, in the form of social cohesion and the citizens’ trust in their traditional 
institutions.” Id. at 616–17.
 31. As one commentator has remarked, rather than assuming that instability is 
undesirable, “[w]e should instead be fostering dissent, and we should be recognizing that 
religious dissent has much to contribute to the creation of a more progressive society.” Steven 
Shiffrin, Propter Honoris Respectum: Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631, 
1634 (1999) (citation omitted). Madison stated that 
[i]n a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as 
that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of 
interests and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of 
security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 270–71 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan 
eds., 2001); see also LOCKE, supra note 9, at 20 (“It is not the diversity of opinions (which 
cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions (which 
might have been granted), that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the 
Christian world upon account of religion.”).
 32. See J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the 
Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981) (“[T]he same respect for human autonomy that 
underlies liberty underlies democracy as well and establishes its intrinsic value.”).
 33. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 6, at 97 (suggesting that many of the most divisive social 
issues in the United States have not involved religion, such as “the completion of industrial 
unionization in the late 1930s; McCarthyism in the early 1950s; the campaign for racial 
equality from the middle 1950s onward; prolongation of the Vietnam War; and perhaps the 
Watergate scandal”).
 34. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1993), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
Eng/Judgments.htm.
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public order or public morals. Proselytism is prohibited.”35 
Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights observed that 
the ban on proselytism was originally enacted after the Orthodox 
Church, “which had long complained of a Bible society’s 
propaganda directed at young Orthodox schoolchildren on behalf of 
the Evangelical Church, managed to get a clause added to the first 
Constitution (1844) forbidding ‘proselytism and any other action 
against the dominant religion.’”36 This ban was eventually codified as 
a criminal offense.37
Kokkinakis was a Jehovah’s Witness who visited the home of a 
woman—whose husband was a cantor at a local Orthodox church—
and engaged with her in a discussion about religion. He was 
convicted of proselytism after a criminal court determined that 
Kokkinakis had 
attempted to proselytize and, directly or indirectly, to intrude on 
the religious beliefs of Orthodox Christians, with the intention of 
undermining those beliefs, by taking advantage of their 
inexperience, their low intellect, and their naïvety. In particular, 
[he] went to the home of [Mrs. Kyriakaki] . . . and told her that 
they brought good news; by insisting in a pressing manner, they 
gained admittance to the house and began to read from a book on 
the Scriptures which they interpreted with reference to a king of 
heaven, to events which had not yet occurred but would occur, 
etc., encouraging her by means of their judicious, skilful [sic] 
explanations . . . to change her Orthodox Christian beliefs.38
In considering whether Kokkinakis’ conviction violated Article 9 
of the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights 
distinguished between “bearing Christian witness and improper 
proselytism.”39 Whereas “the former corresponds to true evangelism, 
which a report . . . describes as an essential mission and a 
responsibility of every Christian and every Church,” improper 
proselytism entails, for example, “exerting improper pressure on 
 35. Id. at 11.
 36. Id. at 12.
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 8–9 (omissions in original). The criminal court sentenced Kokkinakis to four 
months in prison, which was convertible into a pecuniary penalty, as well as a fine of 10,000 
drachmas. The court also ordered the confiscation and destruction of four booklets that 
Kokkinakis had been hoping to sell. Id.
 39. Id. at 21.
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people in distress or in need,” “offering material or social 
advantages” to gain new members, or even “the use of violence or 
brainwashing.”40 The court concluded the Greek courts had failed to 
specify how Kokkinakis’ proselytizing was improper, and therefore 
held that his conviction violated Article 9.41
This case illustrates how governments may be influenced by a 
dominant church to impose restrictions on minority religions.42 The 
motivation of a dominant church is not benign; it wishes to eliminate 
competition. When a church achieves monopoly power, it is in a 
position to restrict and, in some cases, to eliminate less powerful 
religious organizations, thereby hindering the free practice of 
religion in the public square. 
Similar problems of monopoly arise in the context of capitalism 
and market control. While it is true that economic monopolies can 
provide certain services and have some advantages, experience has 
demonstrated that the free enterprise system is far more valuable in 
providing the best climate for economic growth, consumer 
satisfaction, and individual prosperity. There are present examples of 
countries that have made the dynamic swing from central 
organization (government monopoly) to the free enterprise system, 
with resulting benefits and economic progression for its citizens.43
Likewise, when a religious monopoly has the strength to squelch 
other religious views, it diminishes or eliminates the growth 
opportunities for religions generally. Just as some regulation is 
necessary to ensure the smooth operation of markets, so it may be 
necessary for the government to enforce a few basic rules in order to 
keep the public square in good repair and the marketplace of 
religious ideas vibrant. However, when a dominant religion 
monopolizes the public square, the opportunity for individual 
choice, the cross-fertilization of ideas, and other benefits of a 
 40. Id.
 41. Id. at 21–22.
 42. See id. at 11 (explaining that under Article 3 of the Constitution of Greece “[t]he 
dominant religion in Greece is that of the Christian Eastern Orthodox Church”); see also 
Manoussakis v. Greece, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1346 (1997) (describing events in which the Greek 
Orthodox Church made a complaint about the use of a room by Jehovah’s Witnesses, and a 
prosecution was instituted for establishing and operating a place of religious worship without 
authorization from the proper authorities), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/ 
Judgments.htm.
 43. See John White, Privatization in Eastern and Central Europe, 13 INT’L L. 
PRACTICUM 19 (Spring 2000).
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religiously diverse democracy are jeopardized. Thus, just as economic 
monopolies can ultimately undermine capitalism, so too can religious 
monopolies weaken democracy. 
The influence of a dominant religion and government concerns 
about stability are but two of the many obstacles to religious 
freedom today. Other examples include the following: government 
refusal to recognize certain religions, restrictions on the availability 
of visas for religious missionaries, unnecessary restrictions on 
building houses of worship, governmental designation of a religion 
as a “sect” and imposing special restrictions on “sects,” and 
discrimination against religions with headquarters in a different 
country. Any one of these obstacles serves to hinder the development 
of a true public square of religious freedom. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The societal and individual value of the free exercise of religion 
in the public square is vital to our continuing effort to provide the 
best in the democratic institution. It is a topic that deserves our 
individual and joint attention. At this conference, we will identify 
and examine obstacles to religious freedom, with the goal of 
developing a strategy for change. In undertaking this project, we 
must take advantage of the opportunity to learn from the individual 
experiences and perspectives that we each bring to the discussion. I 
now turn the challenge over to you for your participation in this 
exciting conference: “Religion in the Public Sphere: Challenges and 
Opportunities.” 
 
